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RECENT CASES
Administrative Law-Rate Reduction Order Issued Without
Hearing Not Invalid Where Statute Provides Full Review-A statute
empowered the Superintendent of Insurance for the District of Columbia
to order a readjustment of insurance rates, if he determined, upon investigation, that rates were excessive, inadequate, or unreasonable.' Aggrieved parties could "contest the validity" of an order in the District of
Columbia courts. After ex parte investigation, the Superintendent
ordered a reduction of certain rates. Upon petition of the affected companies, the district court enjoined the order, holding that the required "investigation" included a full hearing.2 The Court of Appeals reversed, on
the ground that the statutory right to "contest the validity" of an order is a
right to trial de novo which satisfies the due process requirement of a full
hearing. Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. 3 PIKE & FIsCHER AD.
LAW (Decisions) 41 d. 11-29 (App. D. C. 1948).
Where due process requires a hearing,' it need not be at any particular point in an administrative proceeding, so long as it is had before the final order becomes effective. 4 If appellate review affords an
opportunity to have all objections and defenses considered, there need be
no hearing before promulgation of the order, in the absence of statutory6
mandate.5 The rule has been invoked in cases involving tax assessments,
or where public necessity demands prompt action, 7 or in the valuation of
land taken for public purposes.8 In the rate-making field it has been
applied where the statute requires that a full hearing be granted to any
party requesting it after issuance of the order but before it becomes operative. 9 Here, it is extended to a rate-making statute which does not expressly provide for a full review, by interpreting the right "to contest
the validity" of an order as being a right to review de novo.
This decision requires the district court to reach an independent
determination on each rate order which is appealed. That it will result
in appeals by nearly every aggrieved party can hardly be doubted.Y0 Thus,
in effect, the burden of the final adjustment of most rates is placed upon
the district court, rather than upon the Superintendent of Insurance.'"
1. 58 STAT. 267, D. C. Code § 1403 (Supp. V, 1944): "The Superintendent is empowered . . . to order an adjustment of such rates whenever he determines, after
investigation of the experience showing premiums and losses for a period of not less
than five years next preceding such investigation, that the rates . . . are excessive,
inadequate, or unreasonable."
2. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 67 F. Supp. 76 (D. D. C. 1946). For
a thorough discussion of the District Court's opinion see Ely, Regulation of Fire Insurance Rates, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 59 (1946).
3. That rate-fixing orders require a hearing at some stage was not contested on
appeal as it was in the District Court. See Brief for Appellant, p. 15, and Brief for
Appellees, pp. 12-14.
4. Opp Cotton Mills v. Adm'r, 312 U. S. 126 (1941).
5. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U. S. 197, 234 (1938).
6. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 393 (1934) ; Phillips v. Comm'r, 283 U. S. 589
(1931).
7. Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U. S. 183 (1937).
8. North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276 (1925).
9. United States v. Illinois Central R. R., 291 U. S. 457 (1934).
10. REP. ATr'Y GEN. Comm. AD. PRoc. 79 (1941) : "If review is to extend to 'correctness', then almost'every case would present the issue and almost every losing party
would entertain a reasonable belief that there is a substantial chance of reversal."
11. See Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 444 (1930).
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Proper rate regulation demands that the experience of a specialized agency
be brought to bear in the determination of facts on which to base adjustments. It is with this in mind that legislatures delegate rate-making power to administrative agencies. By shifting the ultimate duty of
rate-fixing to the district court, the very purpose of investing the Superintendent with the power in the first instance is defeated. Previously, where
judicial re-examination of an order issued without a hearing has been
held to satisfy due process, it has not thus resulted in defeating legislative
intent, but rather it has been a vital aid in carrying it out.' 2 Consequently,
the decision can be justified only if it was the best way of assuring the
affected parties adequate procedural safeguards. A full hearing before
the Superintendent would manifestly provide sufficient protection. This
the court could have required by interpreting "investigation" to include
a complete hearing, 13 a course which would not only have afforded
adequate protection, but would have allowed the ultimate rate-making
burden to remain on the Superintendent where the legislature placed it.
In sustaining procedures which in the case before them may seem expedient, courts should not overlook the goal of governmental efficiency,
where it can be attained, as it could in the instant case, without detracting
from the proper protection of the parties affected.

Bills and Notes-Drawee's Liability to Drawer for Paying Check
Drawn to Non-Existent Corporation-Three men, representing themselves as officers of a corporation, concluded a contract with plaintiff
drawer. Planitiff drew a check on drawee bank, designating as payee
the corporation, which on the date of the check had neither de facto nor
de jure existence. Plaintiff did not know that the corporation was nonexistent. One of the alleged corporate officers opened an account in collecting bank with the check. Drawee bank paid the check. The contract
was never performed by the corporation, and plaintiff sued drawee bank
to recover the amount of the check.' The Court of Appeals, reversing
the Appellate Division,2 held unanimously that the drawee bank must recredit plaintiff's account. International Aircraft Trading Company v.
Manufacturers Trust Company and Irving Trust Company, 297 N. Y.
285, 79 N. E. 2d 249 (1948).
A drawee bank's liability 3 to drawer for payment of a check drawn
to a non-existent payee has been made to depend on drawer's knowledge
as to whether or not the payee existed. If drawer knew of the non12. Cf. Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233 (1944) and cases cited
in notes 5, 6, 7, and 8, supra.
13. Cf. Clarksburg-Columbus Bridge Co. v. Woodring, 89 F. 2d 788 (App. D. C.
1937).
1. Although the check in question was never indorsed by the designated payee, it
carried the standard clearing house stamp, and the indorsement of the collecting bank.
By stipulation, the collecting bank conceded its liability to drawee in the event the latter was held liable.
2. 272 App. Div. 795, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 923 (1st Dept. 1947), unanimously affirming
by memorandum 184 Misc. 137, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 200 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
3. It is to be noted that the loss will ultimately fall on the person who gave the
swindler something for the check, assuming, as is usually the case, that the swindler
is judgment-proof or has left the country. Realistically, then, it will be the relative
merit of putting the loss on the drawer or on the person who dealt with the swindler,
that the court will be deciding.
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existence of the payee, the check is payable to bearer, 4 and the bank
incurs no liability to drawer. The converse would seem to be that if
drawer did not know that his intended payee was non-existent, the drawee
must pay according to drawer's order, an obvious impossibility, and is
thus not entitled to pay anybody. 5 Two theories 6 have been used to
justify the drawee's paying the "wrong" person: (1) that the creditor
(drawer) must not do anything to increase the ordinary business risks of
his debtor (drawee), and if he does so, he may not recover from drawee; 7
and (2) that by § 61 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,8 the drawer
is estopped to deny the existence of the designated payee, and consequently
may not recover from drawee.
The first theory has been expressly disapproved in the jurisdiction
where it arose. 9 The second has found little support, 10 and rejection of
it has usually been on the grounds that the language of § 61 excludes
drawees by negative implication, since it mentions only holders and indorsers. 11 This ground of rejection would of course deny drawee in
the instant case the benefit of § 61, and thus the same result would be
reached; yet, since § 61 applies to holders, collecting bank could recover
from drawer, and we have the anomalous situation of drawer collecting
from drawee, drawee from collecting bank, and collecting bank from
drawer.12 On the other hand, the view that drawer is always estopped
under § 61, even as to drawees, would preclude the desirable result reached
in the principal case. It is submitted that this reason is the more realistic one for refusing to apply § 61 to drawees.
The New York court, however, has gone one step further than necessary for decision of this case. Relying on a strong dictum in a previous
4. NEGOTIABLE INsuUmENTS LAW, § 9(3) : ". . . The instrument is payable to
bearer . . . (3) When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable; . . ." (NEW Yoan
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 28, CONS. LAWS CHAP. 38). Cf. the variation in
California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Mexico,
and Wisconsin, states which have added after the words "so payable": "or known to
his employee or other agent who supplies the name of such payee."
5. This view is adopted by the great majority of courts. See, e. g., United Cigar
Stores v. American Raw Silk Co., 184 App. Div. 217, 171 N. Y. Supp. 480 (1st Dept.
1918), aff'd. inem. 229 N. Y. 532, 129 N. E. 904 (1920) ; Shipman v. Bank of State of
New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 27 N. E. 371 (1891).
6. In addition to the theory of the amendment to § 9(3). See note 4 supra.
7. Marcus v. Peoples National Bank, 57 Pa. Super. 345 (1914) (drawing check
to fictitious person did so increase debtor's risk).
8. "The drawer by drawing the instrument admits the existence of the payee and
his then capacity to indorse; and engages that on due presentment the instrument will
be accepted, or paid, or both, according to its tenor, and that if it be dishonored, and
the necessary proceedings on dishonor be duly taken, he will pay the amount thereof
to the holder, or to any subsequent indorser who may be compelled to pay it.
Cf. BILLS OF EXCHANGE AcT, § 55(1).
9. See Commonwealth v. Globe Indemnity Co., 323 Pa. 261, 269, 185 Atl. 796, 800
(1936).
10. Darling Stores, Inc. v. Fidelity Bankers Trust Co., 178 Tenn. 165, 156 S. W.
2d 419 (1941), 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 973 (1942) (§ 61 applied where trustee continued
paying benefits after beneficiary had died, trustee being ignorant of the death) ; BeechNut Packing Co. v. National City Bank of New York, 149 Misc. 682, 268 N. Y. Supp.
51 (N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1933).
11. McCornack v. Central State Bank, 203 Iowa 833, 211 N. W. 542 (1927), 75
U. OF PA. L. REv. 774; for a similar result reached on a different theory, see Robertson Banking Co. v. Brasfield, 202 Ala. 167, 79 So. 651 (1918) [refusing to consider
how § 61 harmonizes with § 9(3) ].
12. See vigorous dissent by Evans, J., in the McCornack case, supra note 11.
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New York case,' 3 it has held that where payee is non-existent, and drawer
ignorant of the fact, the check is not a check at all, but "a legal nullity,
not entitled to be honored." In doing so, it seems to have left itself no
room to render judgment for a drawee in any case where drawer unknowingly draws a check to a non-existent payee; for the "preclusion"
theories mentioned above can never logically be invoked, since the court
has said, in effect, that drawer never drew the check. One wonders if the
court will not regret its holding when faced with a case in which the
drawer was grossly careless in ascertaining whether or not the payee
existed, and drawee, although deceived by excellent forgeries of a certificate of incorporation or corporate resolutions,' 4 has followed prudent banking practices in an effort to ascertain the payee's existence.

Conflict of Laws-Jurisdiction to Escheat Unclaimed Insurance
Proceeds-The New York Abandoned Property Law'. requires that
insurance companies incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction, doing business
in New York, surrender to the Comptroller General presumptively
abandoned proceeds 2 of insurance policies issued for delivery upon the
lives of New York residents.3 Several foreign insurance companies sought
a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of the statute contending, inter alia, that New York had no jurisdiction to escheat funds of
foreign corporations since such right reposed solely in the domiciliary
state of that corporation, and that such action would constitute a violation of due process. The Court (three justices dissenting) upheld the
statute insofar as it applied to policies issued for delivery in New York
upon the lives of persons then resident in New York. Specifically reserved was the question of the validity of the statute in instances where
the insured after delivery ceased to be a resident of New York, or where
the beneficiary was not a resident of New York at the time of the maturity
of the policy. 4 Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., et al. v. Moore,
Comptroller General of the State of New York, 333 U. S. 541 (1948).
The New York Law deviates from recent similar legislation in
Pennsylvania, 5 New Jersey," and Massachusetts 7 in that it is extended to
apply to foreign corporations. Unless the funds are to escheat to more
13. Swift & Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 280 N. Y. 135, 145, 19 N. E. 2d 992, 997
(1939). "If construed in accordance with the law of New York where it was made
payable, it constituted an order to pay to a non-existent person; in other words, it was
a check without a payee to whom it could be delivered, who could transfer it, or who
could demand or receive payment. Such a check is a mere scrap of paper creating
neither right nor obligation." The court then went on to decide the case under § 9(3)
of the Illinois Negotiable Instruments Law, as amended. See note 4 supra.
14. The court in the instant case made much of the fact that the collecting bank
requested neither of these forms of identification, the depositor being introduced by a
customer of the bank. Query, whether this is strictly relevant, for the documents are
apparently to protect the bank from paying to unauthorized representatives of an existing corporation and thus incurring liability to the corporation. See 1 PATON, DiGEST OF LEGAL OPINIONS, 1000.

1. N. Y. ABANDONED

PROP. LAW, Art. VII.
2. Id. § 700.
3. In 1944 the Law was amended to include foreign as well as domestic corporations. See c. 497 of the Laws of 1944.
4. The Court refused to pass on the right of other states to custody of abandoned
insurance proceeds of companies incorporated therein. Instant case at 548.
5. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, §§ 434-437 (Purdon, 1930).
6. N. J. REv. STAT. §§ 17:34-49, 34-58 (1939).
7. MASS. ANN. LAws, c. 175, §§ 149(a), (b), (c), (d) (1945).
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than one state, this innovation will subject such funds to a claim from the
state of incorporation as well as New York. The problem is finding the
factor determinative of jurisdiction to escheat. While it is true that
power to escheat is an incident of sovereignty, s sovereignty could be claimed
on the basis of the domicil of the insured, the beneficiary, or the insurer.
The analogous statutes which allow the escheat of unclaimed bank deposits 9 by the state of incorporation, have been held valid ' 0 without regard to the domicil of the unlocated depositor."1 But the situs of intangible property is by no means well settled in the law. 12 While it has
been held that property may acquire an additional "business situs" for
the purpos6 of taxation,' 3 this doctrine may not necessarily extend to
escheat proceedings. The situs ascribed for one purpose is not controlling
in another and the determinative test should be one based on justice and
convenience. 14 Due process can only be satisfied in the traditional manner by giving the insurer's obligation a fictional situs in only one state
for the purpose of abandoned property appropriation,leaving all other

states without jurisdiction. 15 Whether jurisdiction is to be given to the
domiciliary state of the insured, the beneficiary, the state of incorporation, or any other state claiming that the situs falls within its sovereignty,
is a problem which must be faced and decided squarely. 16 The dissent in
the instant case points out that giving jurisdiction to New York cuts off
the rights of other states having valid claims. 17 The majority based its
decision on the ground that the one-time residence of the insured in New
York shows "sufficient contacts with the transaction" Is to confer jurisdiction, thus establishing a vague test that can be utilized by any of the
claiming states.
The holding, however, was narrowed to apply only to the case where
a policy was issued for delivery on the life of a New York resident and
he and the beneficiary remain residents of New York. The decision, so
restricted, will cover cases which will seldom arise, since manifestly there
is little or no information concerning both the insured and the beneficiary
8. Escheat at common law was derived from concepts of feudal tenures, and limited to real estate. See Garrison, Escheat, Abandoned Property Acts and their Revenue Aspects, 35 Ky. L. J. 302 (1947). Personal property passed only under the doctrine of bona vacantia. See 7 HoInswoRTH, A HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 495 (1925).
In the United States the concept is not so restricted and is considered an incident of
sovereignty, not tenure. In re Melrose Ave., 234 N. Y. 48, 136 N. E. 235 (1922).
9. As early as 1872 Pa. passed such a statute. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, § 302
(Purdon, 1930). Most of the states followed some time later. However it is well
to note that in the bank deposit cases the problem of multiple claims could hardly arise.
10. Security Savings Bank v. California, 263 U. S. 282 (1923) ; cf. United States
v. Klein, 303 U. S. 276 (1938) (abandoned deposits in a court registry). But cf.
First National Bank of San Jose v. California, 262 U. S. 366 (1923) (escheat statute
invalid as applied to funds in national banks).
11. Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233 (1944) ; cf. In re Rappaport's Estate, 317 Mich. 291, 26 N. W. 2d 777 (1947) ()vhere statute overruled doctrine that situs of intangibles is in the domicil of the owner-decedent. Michigan
escheated bank deposits although the depositor died intestate without heirs domiciled
in California). Contra: In re Lyons' Estate, 175 Wash. 115, 26 P. 2d 615 (1933).
12. See Carpenter, Jurisdiction over Debts, 31 HARv. L. REv. 905 (1918).
13. First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U. S. 234 (1937).
14. See Severone Securities Corp. v. L. & L. Ins. Co., 255 N. Y. 120, 123, 174
N. E. 299, 300 (1931) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAws § 51, comment a (1934).
15. 60 HAv. L. REv. 293 (1946).
16. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent strongly contests the propriety of the
Court's taking jurisdiction until the several states present actual claims to a specific
fund. Instant case at 553.
17. Id. at 551.
18. Id. at 548.
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where the funds remain unclaimed. The Court chose to uphold the validity
of the statute under the situation most unlikely to occur, avoiding the
very cases wherein the serious conflicts will arise. When such a case does
arise it would seem apparent that the Court would find it most difficult
to maintain their position, since doing so would thereafter put the insurance companies doing business in many states in a serious dilemma. They
would be forced into the position of stakeholder in a race by the several
states to use this new, device for swelling the public coffers. 19 They will
be subjected to multiple escheat claims, or at20least the cost of multiple
litigation and the difficulties of interpleading.

Constitutional Law-Department of State's Authority in International Relations-An act of Congress 1 obligated the United States
to pay "just compensation" to Finnish ship owners whose vessels were
requisitioned by the United States during the war. Subsequently Finland, in her treaty of peace with England and Russia 2 (the United States
not being a signatory), expressly waived all such claims against those
United Nations with whom she had broken off diplomatic relations. The
Department of State then issued a note to the Finnish Minister 3 declaring
that the United States would not invoke the waiver of Finnish claims as
set forth in the treaty. The Comptroller General refused Finland's request for payment on the ground that the Finnish treaty had released
the United States from its obligation, and thus the Department of State
could not reinstate it without specific statutory authority. Comptroller
General Decision B-73577, March 22, 1948, 16 U. S. L. WEEK 2482

(1948).
This decision raises the question of the respective limitations on the
executive and legislative branchs' power in reference to foreign relations.
Neither the exclusive power of the purse exercised by Congress, 4 nor the
almost exclusive power of the executive branch in foreign affairs 5 can be
disputed. However the legislative control of finance acts as a secondary
check in that Congress may not appropriate the funds necessary to meet
an obligation incurred by the Department of State.6 But in the instant
case the legislature had appropriated the funds required to meet the claims
of the Finnish ship owners. 7 The Comptroller General's position however,
is that the Finnish peace treaty automatically discharged the obligation
of this government. His authority for this proposition 8 does not fully
19. New York State, after the 1944 amendment, collected, by March 31, 1946,
over one-half million dollars from matured endowments, death claims, and paid-up insurance. Garrison, s'upra note 8, at 315-316.
20. See Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939).

1. 55 STAT. 242 (1941), 50 U. S. C. APr. § 1271 (1944), as amended, 56
370 (1942), 50 U. S. C. Apr. § 1271 (Supp. 1947).

STAT.

2. Article 29 of the Treaty of Peace between England, Russia, and Finland, executed Feb. 10, 1947, effective Sept. 15, 1947.
3. Note issued by Department of State Dec. 19, 1947. See instant case for text.
4. U. S. CoNsT. ART. I, §§ 8 and 9; Knote v. United States, 95 U. S. 149, 154
(1877).
5. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. et al., 299 U. S. 304, 319
(1936) ; State of Russia v. National City Bank of N. Y. et al., 69 F. 2d 44, 48 (C. C.
A. 2d 1934) ; 4 HACxWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 642-652 (1942).
6. W. H. TAFT, OuR CHIEF MAGIsTRATE AND His PowEms 115-117 (1916).
7. See note 1 aipra; Pub. L. No. 299, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1 (July 31, 1947).
8. 5

HAcKwoRTH DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

216-222 (1943).
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bear him out; in fact, it tends toward the opposite conclusion.9 Though
it is questionable whether in international law the third party beneficiary
state to a treaty can enforce its rights,10 there can be no question that the
"third state" does not have to accept the benefits." By virtue of the Department of State's authority in foreign affairs 12 it would seem that this
Department was the one having the power to refuse such benefits. In
so doing, the United States is left in its previous position of having incurred an obligation through proper legislative enactment. The Department of State thus merely waived a questionable right; it did not incur a
debt. The Department of State therefore, in no way invaded the sphere
of the legislative branch.
The immediate effect of this decision is to embarrass the Department in its dealings with Finland, and more broadly it places an impractical limitation on the Department of State's authority in conducting
foreign affairs.'-

Equity-Rescission-Mutual Mistake of Fact-In a contract
made in West Virginia, for the sale of land in Ohio, vendor impliedly'
represented that an easement for a right of way over adjoining land to
the public highway went with the land. After delivery of the deed,
vendee took possession of the land; whereupon the owner of the alleged
servient land denied existence of any right of way through his land and
prevented completion of improvements on the road. Vendee demanded
rescission of the contract. Vendor refused and offered instead to bring
action against the alleged servient owner in vendee's name to establish
vendee's right to use the road. Vendee refused to accede to this and brought
suit in West Virginia for rescission of the contract and the deed. The
West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed a decree of rescission based on
mutual mistake of a material fact. Boyd v. Pancake Realty Co., 46 S. E.
2d 633 (W. Va. 1948).
Rescission of a contract for the sale of land or a deed may be had
on grounds of mutual mistake of fact 2 regarding a matter which is an
important element of the contract. 3 The right of access to the public
road which the parties contemplated is sufficiently important to justify
9. Ibid. This section concludes: "Although there is general agreement among
writers on international law that treaties may stipulate for benefits in favor of third
States, there is still much controversy regarding the question as to the legal nature
of the right-if it be such-which is conferred, and particularly as to the position of
the beneficiary State in respect to the enforcement of this right."
10. R..F. ROXBURG, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THmD STATEs (1917)
gives a full discussion and collection of authorities pertaining to this problem.
11. 29 Am. J. INT'L L. Supp. 936 (1935).
12. See note 5 supra; 5 HACKWORTH 488 (1943).
13. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U. S. 304, 320 (1936).

1. The deed contained no reference to this right-of-way. The court drew this
implication from a clause in the contract of sale in which vendor agreed to "finish
stoning the road, which has been started."
2. The plaintiff's bill was based on fraud. But equity grants rescission on a misrepresentation as to a material fact, even though it was an honest one. Bruner v.
Miller, 59 W. Va. 36, 52 S. E. 995 (1906) ; Fearon Lumber & Veneer Co. v. Wilson,
51 W. Va. 30, 41 S. E. 137 (1902) ; see Straus v. Norris, 77 N. J. Eq. 33, 75 A. 980
(1910). But cf. National Fruit Product Co. v. Parks et at., 108 W. Va. 321, 150 S.
E. 749, 751 (1929).
3. Bruner v. Miller, mipra note 2; Wilson v. McConnell, 72 W. Va. 81, 77 S. E.
540 (1913).
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rescission when it is discovered that the right did not exist.4 If the court
had been able to determine that no right of way was appurtenant to the
land, the decision would have aroused no comment. But the court expressly disclaimed any power to decide about the easement, having no
jurisdiction over the servient land or its owner. The mutual mistake upon
which the court based rescission was that both parties thought the right
of way passing with the land was "undisputed and unchallenged," when
in fact it was disputed. Courts regularly refuse specific performance of
executory land contracts when the title of the vendor is even slightly
questionable. 5 But when the contract has ripened into a deed and possession by the grantee, they are more reluctant to grant rescission on the
basis of a defect in the title of the grantor in the absence of actual fraud.
Many courts refuse to grant rescission, requiring vendee to rely on his
covenants of title. 6 West Virginia is among those granting rescission on
this basis 7 but even those jurisdictions require strong evidence of mistake.8

The court was unable to decide the basic question, whether a right
of way was actually conveyed by the deed, 9 and in the light of the general
rule requiring the party seeking cancellation of an instrument to establish
the mistake by clear proof,' 0 a more equitable disposition of this case would
have been to refuse to determine the matter until settlement of the easement issue in an Ohio court at the vendor's expense." By proceeding
to a final determination of the case the court was forced greatly to expand
mutual mistake .2 and apparently to open the way for rescission of a deed
whenever a third party in any way challenges a grantee's title to his land.

Judgments-Collateral Estoppel-Conclusiveness of Surrogate's
Decree-In an action against an alien's estate to recover property that
had been returned ' to the decedent by the Alien Property Custodian,
allegedly as a result of fraud and mistake of law, the United States obtained a judgment for the value of the property on the latter ground.2
The Government, appearing as a judgment creditor in the administration
proceedings, objected to the allowance of fees to the attorney for the
4. Accord, Fisher v. Hurley, 100 A. 566 (N. J. Ch. 1917) (rescission of deed
for fraud when grantor included in it a right-of-way not owned).
5. See Spencer v. Sandusky, 46 W. Va. 582, 585, 33 S. E. 221, 222 (1899);
Comm'r v. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 248 (1871).
6. Decker v. Schulze, 11 Wash. 47, 39 P. 261 (1895) ; Abbott v. Allen, 2 Johns.
Ch. 519 (N. Y. 1817) ; Comment, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 53 (1926).
7. Wilson v. McConnell, supra, note 3.
8. Forester v. Van Auken, 12 N. D. 175, 96 N. W. 301 (1903) ; Pennybacker v.
Laidley, 33 W. Va. 624, 11 S. E. 39 (1890).
9. An investigation of Ohio cases in the light of the facts of this case indicates the
distinct possibility of such a right-of-way existing, either by implied reservation, Ciski
v. Wentworth, 122 Ohio St. 487, 172 N. E. 276 (1930), or way of necessity, Meredith
v. Frank, 56 Ohio St. 479, 47 N. E. 656 (1897).
10. 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 915, 933; 66 C. J. 639; 19 AM. Ji-. 80.
11. This is the view taken by the dissenting judge.
12. For a review of the various grounds of mutual mistake on which rescission
of a deed has been granted, see 36 A. L. R. 482; 19 AM. Jum. 76; 28 L. R. A. (N. s.)

900.

1. The statutory authority for the seizure of the alien's property was the Trading
with the Enemy Act. 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 1 et seq. (1928).
2. United States v. Rodiek, 117 F. 2d 588 (C. C. A. 2d 1941), affd, 315 U. S. 783
(1942).
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estate, alleging participation in the fraud advanced as one basis for the
judgment. 3 The surrogate overruled the objections. 4 The Government
then sued the attorney in a federal court to recover damages for the
alleged fraud.5 A judgment for the Government was reversed by the appellate court and the surrogate's decree held to be conclusive on the issue
of fraud. United States v. Silliman, 167 F. 2d 607 (C. C. A. 3d 1948),
cert. denied, 17 U. S. L. Week 3094 (U. S. Oct. 11, 1948).6
Judges have concluded that it is more desirable to bring litigation to an
end, once a party has had his day in court, than it is to allow further
litigation of issues which have been heard and decided. 7 The determination, by a court of "competent" jurisdiction, of an issue necessary to
a judgment is, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, conclusive in any
subsequent litigation between the same parties, even though the later suit
is based on a different cause of action.8 Courts have been reluctant, however, to hold findings of a court of "limited" jurisdiction conclusive. 9 A
decision as to competence embodies a judgment that the parties have had
a full and fair hearing and it is clear from a review of the cases that
the effect of the doctrine has been denied, most often, to findings of tribunals whose jurisdiction is not comparable to that of the surrogate's. 10
He is given broad powers by statute," powers which have been sustained
by the appellate courts of New York. 1 2 The extension of the doctrine in
the instant case to the decree of a surrogate, moreover, conforms to the
3. A description of previous proceedings in the administration of the estate is found

in Matter of Hackfeld, 180 Misc. 406, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 60 (1943).
4. New York Surrogate's decree entered on the 17th day of April, 1944 (unpublished).
5. United States v. Silliman, 65 F. Supp. 665 (D. N. J. 1946).

6. A secondary ground for the decision was the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV. § 1.
7. Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942).

8. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876) ; So. Pacific R. R. v. United
States, 168 U. S. 1, 48 (1897) ; for a particularly good treatmqnt of the differences
between merger, bar and collateral estoppel, see RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 68
(1942).

9. Loomis v. Loomis, 288 N. Y. 222, 42 N. E. 2d 495 (1942) (a domestic relations court, designated only to hear claims for pecuniary support by one spouse against
another, cannot settle forever, the marriage status of the parties) ; Sanderson v. Niemann, 17 Cal. 2d 563, 110 P. 2d 1025, 32 CALiF. L. REv. 655 (1941) (collateral estoppel held not to apply to the findings of a small claims court where there were no
lawyers allowed and from which only one of the litigants was entitled to take an appeal); see RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 71 (1942) ; Note, 147 A. L. R. 196.

10. See note 9 supra; Scott, sipra note 7, at 19. In the instant case the Surrogate merely listed the objections made by the Government and, without discussion,
overruled them.
11. N. Y. Surr. Ct. Act, L. 1920, Ch. 928, 40, as amended, L. 1938, Ch. 157, 80
(it gives the court jurisdiction to try and determine all questions, arising not only
between a person and the estate but between two persons who have a claim against
an estate).
12. E. g., In re Deutsch's Estate, 186 Misc. 446, 56 N. Y. 2d 768 (1945) (jurisdiction to determine ownership of stock which allegedly was being withheld from the
estate) ; In re Winslow's Estate, 151 Misc. 298, 272 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1934) ; In re
Frame's Estate, 128 Misc. 788, 219 N. Y. Supp. 759 (1926), aff'd without opinion,
234 App. Div. 748, 254 N. Y. Supp. 917 (1931), (surrogate has jurisdiction
to vacate and set aside releases obtained by fraud); Raymond v. Davis' Estate
248 N. Y. 67, 161 N. E. 421 (1928) (power to adjust a controversy between those who
voluntarily appear or who are brought in by supplemental citation although the matter
requires the issuance of an order to liquidate a partnership). See Griffith v. Bank of
New York, 147 F. 2d 899, 902 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 874 (1945)
(commenting on the broad jurisdiction of the surrogate, the court said that a finding
of no fraud by the Surrogate would be conclusive in the federal court if such a finding
had been made).
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3
policy manifested in recent United States Supreme Court decisions.'
In concluding that the surrogate's court is a competent tribunal for purposes of collateral estoppel the court has created a precedent without disturbing the well established rule that every party have his "day" in
court.

Railroads-Voluntary Merger-Dissenting Shareholders' Rights
to be Determined Solely by Federal Law-The Chesapeake and Ohio
Ry. and the Pere Marquette Ry. applied to the Interstate Commerce
Commission for approval of a plan for voluntary merger under the Interstate Commerce Act.'
Dissenting preferred shareholders of the Pere
Marquette intervened, and asked the ICC to require modification of the

plan so as to grant them liquidation preferences allegedly guaranteed under

Michigan law.2 The ICC declined to adjudicate the claim, but left the
dissenters free to pursue possible remedies in state courts.3 In the district
court, the dissenters contended, in a suit to set aside the order of the ICC
authorizing the merger, that the ICC was empowered by the Act to adjudicate the claim, but was bound to apply state law in so doing. The
ICC and the Chesapeake and Ohio maintained that the claim was outside
the jurisdiction of the Commission because it bore no relation to the public interest. Sustaining the position of the respondents, the district court
dismissed the suit on the merits, 4 but on direct appeal to the Supreme
Court, the judgment was reversed. 5 Refusing either view, the Court held
that dissenting shareholders' rights in a voluntary railroad merger are to
be determined by the ICC, and solely on the, basis of federal law.
Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U. S. 182 (1948).
The Act coniains no reference to dissenting shareholders' rights as
such. 6 The pattern of the decision, however, is not -unprecedented. Pre13. Cf. Sealfon v.United States, 332 U. S.575 (1948) ; Angel v. Bullington, 330
U. S. 183 (1947).
1.As amended by the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 905 (1940), 49 U. S.
C. § 5 (1946) ; 41 STAT. 494 (1920), 49 U. S.C.§ 20a (1946).
2. The Pere Marquette's Michigan charter guaranteed full payment at par plus
accrued unpaid dividends upon liquidation, before junior shareholders might participate. The dissenters contended that under Michigan law merger was equivalent to
liquidation of the merged corporation.
3. Pere Marquette Ry. Merger, 267 I. C. C. 207 (1947). The Commission calculated that maximum recovery by the dissenters in the state courts would not impair
the new carrier's ability to perform its service.
4. Schwabacher v.United States, 72 F. Supp. 560 (E. D. Va. 1947).
5. Frankfurter, J., wrote a dissenting opinion, inwhich Vinson, C. J., and Burton,
J., concurred.
6. § 5(2) provides, "(b) . . . If the Commission finds that, subject to such
terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable,
the proposed transaction is within the scope of subparagraph (a) and will be consistent
with the public interest, itshall enter an order approving and authorizing such *transaction. .

.

."

§ 5(11) provides, "The authority conferred by this section shall be

exclusive and plenary, and any carrier . . . participating inor resulting from any
transaction approved by the Commission thereunder, shall have full power (with the
assent . . . of a majority, unless a different vote isrequired under applicable state
law, in which case the number so required shall assent, of the votes of holders of
shares entitled to vote

. . .) to carry such transaction into effect

. . . without

invoking any approval under State authority; and any carriers . . . shall be and
they are hereby relieved from the operation of the anti-trustlaws and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as
may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transactions so approved...."
§ 20a(7) provides, "The jurisdiction conferred upon the Commission by this section
shall be exclusive and plenary, and a carrier may issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities in accordance with the provisions of this section without securing
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viously, the Court has held that several other situations not explicitly
provided for by the Act were intended to come within its scope, and to be
removed from state regulation. 7 These decisions are unified by the principle that the national transportation policy is a matter of prime public
concern, S and that Congress has intended by the Act to provide a grant
of powers sufficient to effectuate this policy.9 The instant case appears
to fall into this group. It is the more remarkable because it imposes on
the ICC a jurisdiction it sought to disclaim. Having brought the dissenters under federal law, the Court denied them liquidation preferences
on the ground that merger is not equivalent to liquidation. 10 Therefore,
it concluded, each shareholder is entitled to receive only the current economic equivalent of his interest."
By declaring federal law conclusive of the question, the Court has
substantially simplified the fask of the ICC,' 2 and has given voluntary
merger a forward impetus. A dictum, which challengingly widens the
potentialities of the decision, suggests that the same theory may be extended to other aspects of capital structure, e. g., creditors' rights. 13
At any rate, henceforth merger plans can be forced upon a large proportion of dissenting shareholders, 14 whose liquidation preferences under state
law would effectively prohibit the operation by requiring the withdrawal
of too much capital from the merged corporation. Since merger and consolidation are regarded as primary means of placing the railroads on a
sounder economic basis, 15 the decision is consonant with the requirements of the overriding national transportation policy.
approval other than as specified herein." (Emphasis supplied throughout.) The
court drew a negative inference as to the Congressional intent from the omission to
provide for dissenters' rights, and contrasted it with the explicit provision for observance of state laws regulating shareholders' assent, § 5 (2) supra.
7. New York Cent. Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12, 27 (1932)
(state limitations on corporate powers to issue securities or assume liabilities of another); Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522, 532 (1933) (authorization by the
ICC to abandon railroad facilities notwithstanding prohibition by state law) ; Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U. S.134, 147 (1946) (power of the ICC over terms
of trackage rights contracts exclusive).
8. DECLARATION OF NATIONAL TANSPORTATION POLICY, 54 STAT. 899 (1940). 49
U. S. C. § 1 (1946). See, e. g., Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S.
456, 478 (1923). For a review of federal railroad legislation relating to merger, see
LEONARD, RAILROAD CONSOLIDATION UNDER THE TRANSPORTATION Act OF 1920 (1946).
9. Cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S.67, 86 (1944) (power
of ICC to abrogate anti-trust laws in authorizing consolidation of motor carriers).

There is no constitutional barrier. See North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U. S.686,
705 (1945).

10. "Since the federal law clearly contemplates merger as a step in continuing the
enterprise, it follows that what Michigan law might give these dissenters on a windup
or liquidation is irrelevant. .
.." Instant case at 200.
11. The identical approach was adopted in holding-company dissolutions ordered
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Cf. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323

U.S. 624 (1945).

12. The ICC no longer need make a speculative appraisal of the relation to the
public interest of possible recovery by dissenters in state courts. In addition, the
danger is removed that such recovery will pave the way for the assertion of similar
claims by "assenting" shareholders, on the basis of nondisclosure in the proxy state-

ment. Cf. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F. 2d 36 (C. C. A. 3d 1947).

13. "Its purpose to bring within its scope everything pertaining to the capital
structures of such mergers could hardly be made more plain." Instant case at 198.
14. The only limitation would seem to be that the number of assenting votes required by applicable state law must be obtained, § 5 (2), mupra note 6.
15. "The consensus of opinion is that savings possible under a six or seven-system
plan of consolidation would range from $200,000,000 to $500,000,000 a year. . .
LEONARD, op. cit. stipra note 8, at 295.
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Tenancy by the Entireties-Effect of Attempt to Create a Tenancy by the Entireties in Absence of a Valid Marriage-A married
man left his wife and was living with a mistress a few miles away. The
man and his mistress purchased property as man and wife taking title as
"tenants by the entireties." The mistress made the down payment and
kept up all payments on the mortgage. At the man's death, his wife instituted partition proceedings as his statutory heir to one-half of the undivided property. The Supreme Court (three justices dissenting) reversed the order for partition and dismissed the complaint. Maxwell v.
Saylor, 359 Pa. 94, 58 A. 2d 355 (1948).
Although tenancy by the entireties is recognized in Pennsylvania and
many other states,' it is settled law that such an estate can only be created
when the grantees are husband and wife.2 The issue raised for decision,
therefore, was not whether a tenancy by the entireties had been created,
but whether there was created a tenancy in common, or a joint estate with
the incident of survivorship.3 This question turned on whether the words
"tenancy by the entireties" showed the intention to create a joint estate
with the incident of survivorship as required by statute.4 The majority
in the instant case, with almost no precedent, 5 decided that such an estate
was created. They reasoned that the differences between the two estates
become academic when one of the grantees dies. Regardless of the technical distinctions between these two types of estate,6 the parties did manifest the intention to create some estate which was to be owned completely
by one grantee upon the death of the other. The creation of a joint estate
with the incident of survivorship, therefore, most closely approximated the
manifest intent of the parties. The dissent adopted a conceptual viewpoint
in reaching a contrary result. Following the lead of a New York decision, 7

1. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 433 (3rd Ed. 1939).
2. Thorton v. Pierce, 328 Pa. 11, 194 Atl. 897 (1937) and note 92 A. L. R. 1420
(1934).
3. The law is also settled that such a conveyance will not be set aside but will
create some estate "appropriate to the circumstances." Thorton v. Pierce, 328 Pa. 11,
194 Atl. 897 (1937). This is subject to the qualification that the grant may be
avoided or modified in equity on a finding of fraud or mistake. Hutson v. Hutson, 168
Md. 182, 177 AtI. 177 (1934) ; Butler v. Butler, 93 Misc. 258, 157 N. Y. Supp. 188
(Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1916).
4. PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 121 (Purdon, 1930) : "If partition be not made between joint tenants . . . the parts of those who die first shall not accrue to the survivor but shall descend or pass by devise . . . and be considered to every intent and
purpose in the same manner as if such deceased joint tenants had been tenants in common . . ." This act has been limited by a long line of cases to those situations
where there has been no intention to create survivorship as an incident of the estate,
e. g., McCallum's Estate, 211 Pa. 205, 60 Atl. 903 (1905) ; Montgomery v. Keystone
Savings and Loan, 150 Pa. Super. 577, 29 A. 2d 203 (1943). 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 424 (3rd Ed. 1939) indicates similar statutes in other jurisdictions.
5. In Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 170 Atl. 733 (1933) where there were
six grants to the same parties as "tenants by the entireties" (the grantees being unmarried) and three containing the additional language, "and to the survivor of them,"
it was held that in the grants without such additional language, there was sufficiently
shown the intention to create survivorship. See also County Capital Bldg. and Loan
Assn. v. Cummings, 55 York Leg. Rec. 20 (C. P. Blair County, Pa., 1941) (joint tenancy created for the purpose of permitting full recovery by an innocent mortgagee
against a surviving mortgagor).
6. See FREEMAN, COTENANCY AND PARTITION § 64 (2d Ed. 1886) for a discussion
of the "five unities of title" in tenancy by the entireties as opposed to the "four unities
of title" in joint tenancy with the incident of survivorship.
7. Perrin v. Harrington, 146 App. Div. 292, 130 N. Y. Supp. 944 (4th Dept.
1911). The same result has been reached without joint tenancy or survivorship being
placed at issue. Texido v. Merical, 132 Misc. 764, 230 N. Y. Supp. 605 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1928) ; McKee v. Bevins, 138 Tenn. 249, 197 S. W. 563 (1917).
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they argued that tenancy by the entireties and joint tenancy with the
incident of survivorship are not the same." Tenancy by the entireties
was impossible in this case. 9 An attempt to create a tenancy by the entireties does not show an intention to create the incident of survivorship,
and hence, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1812,10 no such
estate was created.
The result reached is sound and realistic on its facts. The disfavor
shown by the law toward attempts to create an estate with the incident
of survivorship 1 is counterbalanced by a policy which seeks to effectuate
the intention manifested by parties to conveyances. Thus, at least where
the survivor's money is used to purchase the estate, she should prevail
against the estate of the decedent. No problem arises to prevent the
same result if the action were brought by a creditor of the survivor against
the property, 12 but the court might well sacrifice the principle of certainty
to reach the opposite result if a case arose in which the decedent's money
was used. 13 A different result might also be reached if a creditor of the
decedent asserted rights against the property.'" In any event, since the
situation is one likely to recur, the court could well have presented a
clearer precedent had it stated with greater precision the influence on the
decision of the fact that the survivor had paid the purchase money.

Trade Regulation-Publication of Trade Association Resolution
-Conspiracy to Boycott-An association representing approximately
98% of the wholesale grocers 1 in the San Francisco area, publicized 2 a
resolution branding as unfair, direct sales to retailers 3 by packers who
also sold to wholesalers in the same area. The FTC brought a complaint
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 4 charging the
association with a conspiracy to boycott. The Commission tested the lawfulness of the association's actions by examining evidence of subsequent
8. See note 6 supra. Survivorship in tenancy by the entireties is based on a continuation of the same estate whereas in joint tenancy there is an ascendancy to a new
estate. See Stucky v. Keefe's Ex'rs, 26 Pa. 397, 399 (1856).
9. See note 2 supra.
10. See note 4 supra.
11. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 424 (3rd Ed. 1939).
12. County Capital Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Cummings, 55 York Leg. Rec. 20
(C. P. Blair County Pa., 1941).
13. "In the present case it is especially just and proper that the defendant should
be conceded the right of survivorship since every dollar of the money invested in the
property was hers. . . ." Instant case at 97, 58 A. 2d 356. The case relied upon
by the dissent, Perrin v. Harrington, 146 App. Div. 292, 130 N. Y. Supp. 944 (4th
Dept. 1911) was a case in which the survivor had not paid the purchase money.
14. This result would appear to be probable although there is no authority directly
on point. Pennsylvania courts have indicated a desire to protect innocent creditors in
such a situation in Thorton v. Pierce, 328 Pa. 11, 194 Atl. 897 (1937) and County
Capital Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Cummings, 55 York Leg. Rec. 20 (C. P. Blair County,
Pa., 1941).
1. The membership of the association consists of wholesale grocers, chain store
operators, retailer-owned wholesale grocers and importing wholesalers.
2. Copies of the resolution were sent to seven trade association groups composed
variously of wholesalers, packers and brokers. In the transmittal letter to the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America the association emphasized their 98% control.
3. The association defined as proper customers for packers; established wholesalers or retail chains with at least three units and a central warehouse.
4. 38 STAT. 719 (1914) as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1940).
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acts alleged to have been in furtherance of the respondent's purpose;
found such evidence inconclusive; and, rejecting the recommendations of
the trial examiner, dismissed the complaint by a 3-2 vote. Grocery Distributors Association of Northern California, Dkt. No. 5177, FTC, April
13, 1948. 5
Conspiracy with intent to boycott 6 is a restraint of trade in violation
of the Sherman Act 7 and is therefore an unfair trade practice under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.8 The proof of a conspiracy
under the Sherman Act is not dependent on any overt act other than the
act of conspiring. 9 Nor must the act be, in terms, an agreement to cease
dealing, or a threat to cease dealing. It is enough if the necessary result
of the concerted action would be a restraint of trade. 10 In the instant case,
the damage may have been done when the resolution was publicized. Most
packers market brands not nationally advertised and are wholly dependent
upon the good will of wholesalers and chain store operators for the widespread distribution of their product. Such packers who were not at the
time selling direct to retailers, would probably be induced by the association's expression of disapproval not to do so. The members of the association need not cease dealing entirely with the errant supplier. They could
merely refrain from "pushing" a particular manufacturer's product or, with
a plea of "no market," refuse to handle any new brands he might offer.
Thus, to an appreciable extent, the practice of "direct selling" by manufacturers could be discouraged with little likelihood that additional acts
constituting a "boycott" could be proven. It would seem, therefore, in
situations like that of the instant case, the commission, in determining the
lawfulness of respondent's conduct, should consider not only any overt acts
committed in futherance of an alleged conspiracy, but should also weigh
carefully the effects that might be produced by the initial combination in
and of itself.
The Commission might also have taken the approach that price-fixing
had been practiced; for there are strong indications in the opinion that
respondent's principal, if not sole, objection to the condemned practice
was that packers were selling direct to retailers at wholesale prices."-' Respondent's action was taken while some of its members were allegedly engaged in fixing retail prices.' 2 That each of these activities complemented
the other is apparent. Thus, with a slight shift in emphasis, there appears
to be sufficient support for a finding that respondent's activities constituted
5. Reported in 3 CCH TRADE REG. SERV. (9th ed.) ff 13729 (FTC 1948).
6. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Association v. United States, 234 U. S.
600 (1913) ; Montague v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38 (1904) ; Kirkpatrick, Comnercial Boycotts as Per Se Violations of the Sherman Act, 10 GEO. WASHr. L. REv. 302 and 387
(1942).
7. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
8. FTC v. Beechnut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 453 (1922) ; Keasbey and Mattison Co. v. FTC, 159 F. 2d 940, 946 (C. C. A. 6th 1947).
9. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U. S. 150, 225, n. 59 (1940) ; Nash
v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 378 (1913).
10. United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 105, 106 (1948); United States v.
Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 543 (1912).
11. Instant case at 4; see Commissioner Mason, concurring at 12.
12. The Commission dismissed the portion of the complaint in the instant case
which charged some of the members of respondent with fixing and attempting to fix
the retail prices of food because the organization, Food Trades Institute, through
which the alleged price-fixing activities were conducted had been dissolved prior to
the filing of the complaint. Instant case at 3; see Commissioner Mason, concurring
at 12.
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an agreement to fix prices at
the wholesale level, an agreement illegal per
1
se under the Sherman Act.
The Commission's decision to dismiss the complaint appears to have
been motivated by two additional considerations. First, that the conduct
of respondent was within the protection of the doctrine of freedom of
speech; 14 and second, that a present public interest no longer obtained because of the time which had elapsed since the resolution was adopted. 15
Whatever the reason for the decision, there is danger that it will encourage
trade associations to take similar action directed against large single-unit
retailers in order to stifle price competition. 16 The Commission's reliance
on lapse of time, however, serves substantially to weaken the precedent
value of this case by furnishing a strong ground for distinguishing similar
cases in the future. It is not likely that the Commission will allow to go
unchallenged a wide spread adoption
of the course of action followed by the
7
respondent in the instant case.'
13. "Prices are fixed . . . if the prices paid or charged are to be at a certain
level . . . or if by various formulae they are related to the market price. . .
Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of
raising, depressing, fixing, pegging or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . is
illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Co., 310 U. S. 150, 222, 223 (1940);
accord,United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
14. See instant case, Commissioner Mason concurring at 6-9. A hint of the same
consideration is contained in the majority opinion at page four: "Remonstrance by
concert is not per se synonymous with conspiracy to boycott. . . ." But courts have
consistently condemned "peaceful persuasion" in similar situations. Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers v. United States, 234 U. S. 600 (1913) ; Arkansas Wholesale
Grocers Association v. FTC, 18 F. 2d 866, 872 (C. C. A. 8th 1927).
15. The acts of respondent all took place between 1938 and 1940, the original complaint issued in 1944. Instant case "at 5. However, the investigation leading to the
complaint was started shortly after the resolution was adopted. It would be natural
for respondent to refrain from any further acts while the complaint was pending. See
instant case, Commissioner Ayres, dissenting at 26.
16. The volume of purchases by the single-unit retailer is large enough to warrant direct sales at wholesale prices by the manufacturer, but such retailer has a cost
advantage for he has little or no warehouse or distribution expense.
17. See instant case, Commissioner Ayres, dissenting at 26.

